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BOOK SUMMARY

Courting Failure
COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS. By Lynn M.

LoPucki. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005.
Pp. xii, 322. $27.95 (cloth).
LYNN M. LoPuCKIt

Courting Failure' is the story of a bad venue statute
that led to rampant forum shopping by large public
companies. This forum shopping induced competition
among bankruptcy courts for the cases. That competition in
turn caused the unnecessary failure of many of the
reorganizing companies and corrupted the United States
Bankruptcy Courts. Congress has not acted to fix the
statute because of Delaware's parochial interest in
preserving the status quo.
INTRODUCTION

The Courting Failure story begins with enactment of
the statute in 1978.2 The statute established four separate

t Security Pacific Bank Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Email:
Lopucki@law.ucla.edu.
1. LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005).

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2000).
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bases for bankruptcy venue. A debtor could file at (1) its
residence or domicile, (2) its headquarters, (3) the location
of its principal assets, or (4) any place where an affiliate of
the debtor was already in bankruptcy. In self-serving
decisions, the competing bankruptcy courts held that a
corporation's "residence or domicile" was at its place of
incorporation.
Together, these four alternatives gave large public
companies the right to file almost anywhere they chose. The
first and fourth alternatives are the most problematic. The
Enron case illustrates their use. Enron was a Houstonbased company, incorporated in Oregon. Enron's top
executives, including Kenneth Lay, Andrew Fastow, and
Jeffrey Skilling, were all on the fiftieth floor of Enron's
gleaming glass headquarters building in downtown
Houston. Seven thousand five hundred other Enron
employees worked in Houston. Enron's executives, however,
chose to file Enron's bankruptcy in New York, where the
company had only fifty-seven employees engaged in a small
trading operation. The legal basis for that choice was that
Enron Metals & Commodity Corporation, an Enron
subsidiary, was incorporated in New York. The executives
put the New York subsidiary into bankruptcy in New York,
put Enron into bankruptcy in New York a few minutes
later, and claimed proper venue on the ground that Enron's
affiliate (the New York subsidiary) was already in
bankruptcy there. The New York court, which was
competing for cases like Enron, agreed.
When the new venue statute went into effect in 1979,
companies began cautiously exercising their new right to
choose. The rate of forum shopping-defined as filing in a
court away from the company's headquarters-was about
20% in the early 1980s. In the middle of that decade, it
increased to about 40% and plateaued. The rate rose to
about 65% in the mid-1990s where it has remained since.
The drafters of these venue rules realized they were
giving companies a broad choice of courts in which the
companies could legally file. The drafters had no intent,
however, to give debtors the right to pick the courts that
would decide their cases. They gave broad choice only to
make sure each company had the right to file in the most
appropriate court. They reasoned that if a company chose a
court other than the most appropriate, the chosen court
would transfer the case to the most appropriate court. What
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they failed to anticipate was that the bankruptcy courts
would want the cases, compete for them, and refuse to
transfer them.
Transfers of large public company cases are rare.
Courting Failure observes that of the ninety largest cases
filed in Delaware, the Delaware court transferred not a
single one. The Enron case illustrates the extent of the notransfer problem. Major creditors petitioned the New York
bankruptcy court to transfer venue to Houston. The New
York court ruled that the case should remain in New York
"in the interests
of justice and for the convenience of the
3
parties."
I observe in CourtingFailurethat:
Not all judges do want the cases. Those who do, want them
for any of four reasons. The most obvious are personal. A
judge who presides over the reorganizations of large public
companies has the opportunity to work with the leading
professionals in the fields of bankruptcy and finance. When
the judge does so, the judge is the most powerful person in
the room. Millions and sometimes even billions of dollars
turn on his or her decision. The status that power confers
extends beyond the courtroom.
Celebrity comes along with the power. The judges'
decisions are reported in the media. Judges in the biggest
cases have standing invitations from professional
organizations to travel to resort cities at the organizations'
expense to give speeches and be honored. If they return to
law practice, which many do, clients with big cases will seek
them out. When a bankruptcy judge dies, the obituary will
likely mention the big cases over which the judge presidedassuming, of course, there were any.
The most important reasons that the judges want the big
cases, however, are more subtle. Each bankruptcy judge is a
member of a community. In any large city in the United
States, there are 100 or more lawyers and other
professionals specializing in bankruptcy practice. Those
professionals interact daily as they resolve cases in the local
bankruptcy court. The professionals in a city typically form
an association that meets regularly for lunch and
occasionally for multi-day conferences. Many of the members
become close friends.

3. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (2000); In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327, 347 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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When a bankruptcy judgeship becomes available, the
community seeks to install one of its own. More often than
not, the effort succeeds. As with any position of leadership,
the one chosen incurs a debt to his or her supporters. Those
supporters expect a certain amount of loyalty. If a judge
forgets how he or she got the job, the judge will be reminded
if and when the judge seeks a second term. The committee
that passes on reappointments will probably survey the
members of the local bankruptcy bar regarding the quality
of the judge's prior service. A recent study found that more
than 8 percent of the bankruptcy judges who applied for
reappointment during the period 1998 to 2002 were not
reappointed. Others won reappointment but only after their
competence had been challenged and they had been "put
through the wringer."
For bankruptcy professionals, bankruptcy venue is a
bread-and-butter issue. If a big St. Louis company-such as
TWA, Purina Mills, or Solutia-files in St. Louis, leading St.
Louis bankruptcy lawyers are likely to get the key roles in
the case and the big fees that come with them. If the case is
big enough, virtually every bankruptcy lawyer in St. Louis
will have a client. If instead the company files in some other
city, bankruptcy lawyers in that city will get most of the
work and the money. If most of the cases from a city go
elsewhere, the career prospects in that city may be limited.
And if the lawyers in a city view their judges as the cause of
that problem, things can get ugly.
The process by which pressure to compete is brought to
bear on the judges is brutal and intimidating. The lawyers
who place cases are among the most powerful and
prestigious of the bankruptcy bar. They publicly laud the
judges who give them what they want and harshly criticize
those who do not. Some of the latter become pariahs of the
national bankruptcy bar-judges considered so bad they
drive the cases away. 4 Lawyers-and other judges-malign
them as "toxic judges."
NEW YORK
In the early 1980s, the New York bankruptcy court was
the destination of choice for large public company
bankruptcies. That court achieved about a 30% market
share. Lawyers gave as their reasons for choosing New York

4. LoPucKI, supra note 1, at 20-23.
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the city's unique position as the financial center of the
United States, the experience of the New York bankruptcy
judges with big cases, and the willingness of the New York
judges to give debtors lengthy delays and debtors'
professionals big fees.
Although the four-to-five-judge New York court
assigned cases by random draw, a single judge-Burton R.
Lifland-ended up with more than half the cases. New
York's reign as the bankruptcy capital of the United States
came to an end in the late 1980s with a dispute over the
randomness of the random draw. The void left by New
York's disappearance did not last long.
DELAWARE

During the 1980s, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware was a sleepy backwater. During
the entire decade, the Delaware court reorganized only one
large public company. That company, Phoenix Steel, barely
met the standard for "large" ($230 million in assets,
measured in current dollars) and its choice of the Delaware
court was probably just a convenience. Phoenix Steel's
assets and operations were located in Delaware. In
November of 1990, the Delaware court suddenly began
attracting companies from out of state. The number of
companies attracted grew steadily in a time when the
number of large public company filings nationally was
falling. By 1996, Delaware had achieved a near monopoly
on large public company bankruptcy filings. That year,
thirteen of the fifteen large public companies (87%) that
filed anywhere in the United States filed in Delaware.
That it was Delaware rather than some other court that
made this move was not coincidental. The Delaware legal
community has a long history of competing to sell legal
advantage to clients from outside the state.
Despite its onshore location, the state of Delaware is a
haven, engaged in many of the same businesses pursued by
offshore havens such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, the
Cook Islands, Gibraltar, the Jersey Islands, the Netherlands
Antilles, and Mauritius. Havens are states or countries that
turn lawmaking into a business and prey on their neighbors.
Their lawmaking differs from that of other governments in
that the laws havens make are not for their own citizens.
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are law

As described in the prologue, Delaware got its start as a
haven over a century ago, in the business of incorporation.
Some 60 percent to 80 percent of all large public companies
incorporated in the United States are incorporated in
Delaware. "Incorporation" is, of course, a mere legal fiction.
To incorporate in Delaware, the company need have no
employees, assets, offices, or operation there. All a company
need do to gain the benefits of Delaware incorporation is
send documents and money to Delaware's public officials.
The main benefit of Delaware incorporation is freedom from
restriction by the corporate laws of other states and
countries. The "internal affairs" of a corporation are
governed by the law of the state or country of incorporation.
For a Delaware corporation, that means Delaware law,
regardless of 6where in the world the corporation actually
does business.
Delaware is also in the usury-facilitation business. That is,
Delaware provides a haven for credit card issuers, who
interest rates prohibited by
charge residents of other states
7
the laws of those other states.
Seeking to build on its success in attracting
incorporations, Delaware has recently engaged in efforts to
sell corporations on the idea of litigating in Delaware.
Among those efforts was the mailing of a glossy brochure
touting a survey commissioned by the United States
Chamber of Commerce. In that survey, in-house lawyers for
large public companies ranked the Delaware state courts
first in the nation on each of ten criteria. The survey shows
corporations clearly satisfied with their treatment in the
Delaware courts. The survey's criteria included "punitive
summary
of
"timeliness
and
damages"
judgment/dismissal"-two issues dear to the virtual hearts
of American corporations.
By 1990, Delaware was already well established in the
business of selling law, legal status, and litigation to the rest
of the United States. Delaware's expansion into the
bankruptcy reorganization of large public companies was a
logical next step. Delaware already had the confidence of the

5. Id. at 51.

6. Id. at 53.
7. Id.
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large public companies that were filing for bankruptcy.
Seventy-three percent of the large public companies that
have filed bankruptcy in 8the United States since 1992 were
incorporated in Delaware.
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRIKES BACK
The sudden shift of big-case forum shopping to
Delaware surprised and alarmed bankruptcy lawyers and
judges in the rest of the United States. The shift cost nonDelaware lawyers millions of dollars in fees. Bankruptcy
judges throughout the United States were concerned about
the loss of their biggest cases and the overall appearance of
impropriety.
Scandal stuck at the end of 1996 and the beginning of
1997. First, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
recommended that Congress eliminate venue based on
incorporation or the pendency of an affiliate's case. Second,
a report on bankruptcy forum shopping prepared by the
Federal Judicial Center for the Judicial Conference of the
United States reported that the chief judge of the Delaware
bankruptcy court routinely had ex parte contacts with the
lawyers for large public companies that had not yet filed
cases. Just seventeen days after release of the Federal
Judicial Center report, the chief judge of the Delaware
district court revoked the reference of Chapter 11 cases to
the bankruptcy court. The district court essentially took
over the bankruptcy court's big-case docket.
Delaware hung on and the sense of outrage over
Delaware's grab for the big-case bankruptcies did not last.
By the end of 1998, the scandal had blown over. It was clear
that Congress would take no action on bankruptcy venue.
The bankruptcy courts accepted the reality of competition.
If they wanted big cases, the courts would have to fight for
them.
FAILURE
The consequences of court competition for reorganizing
companies did not become clear until 2000. That year, Sara
D. Kalin and I discovered that companies reorganized in
Delaware and New York during the period of the Delaware
8. Id. at 55-56.
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court's ascendancy refailed at rates two to ten times as high
as the rates for companies incorporated in other courts. The
extent of the debacle is captured in Table 6 of Courting
Failure.9
Table 6. Failure Rates by Court, Large Public Companies Emerging
1991-96
Delaware

New York

11 (42%)

3 (19%)

2 (4%)

6 (24%)

4 (25%)

7 (13%)

Reorganization failures

14 (54%)

5 (31%)

8 (14%)

Earnings

-9%

-3%

Number of cases
for this court

26

16

Refilings
Business failures

Other courts

1%
56

The table shows that large public companies that
reorganized in Delaware and emerged as public companies
were more than ten times as likely to refile bankruptcy
within five years (a 42% refiling rate for Delaware, as
compared with a 4% rate for courts other than Delaware
and New York).lo One aspect of the mechanism by which
Delaware-reorganized companies failed is also apparent
from the table. Companies emerging from reorganization in
courts other than Delaware and New York had average
earnings of 1% per year during the five year period after
bankruptcy.
Companies
emerging
from
Delaware
reorganization had average losses of 9% per year.
Companies were flocking to the courts least likely to
reorganize them successfully.
THE COMPETITION GOES NATIONAL

During the late 1990s, the bankruptcy community
remained unaware of the Delaware and New York courts'
high refailure rates. Lawyers, judges, and reorganizing
9. Id. at 113.
10. Later shifts in the data increased the Other Courts' refiling rate from
4% to 6%. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database (2005), available
at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu.

2006]

BOOK SUMMARY: COURTING FAILURE

333

companies supposed that "the market's" preference for
Delaware and New York reorganization indicated that
those courts were doing the best, not the worst, job of
reorganizing companies. Big-case bankruptcy was booming,
and Delaware and New York were getting the lion's share
of the business. More than forty large public companies a
year were filing in Delaware at the peak. One effect of
Delaware's success was to spur competitive efforts by
bankruptcy courts in nearly all major cities. The fact that
the courts were competing for their cases put the case
placers in the driver's seat. They could play courts off
against one another, and in the long run, get pretty much
whatever they wanted.
Delaware's new bankruptcy industry came at the expense
of bankruptcy lawyers practicing in major cities throughout
the rest of the country. Those lawyers began pressing their
local bankruptcy judges to respond to Delaware's
competitive threat. Courts in several major cities modified
their local rules and practices to compete for large public
company bankruptcies.
This response to Delaware was possibly unprecedented. In
other circumstances, courts have sometimes expressed views
or made rulings that attracted cases. In the 1980s, for
example, the liberal Texas state courts attracted the cases of
workers injured on North Sea Oil rigs. In the early 1990s,
U.S. district judge Jack Weinstein attracted gun and tobacco
plaintiffs from all over the United States to his court in
Brooklyn. But those were merely situations in which judges
expressed views that attracted cases. Judges were not
changing their views in order to compete with other courts
for cases.
Some of the changes that resulted from the bankruptcy
court competition were for the better. Judges who had
thought of themselves as emperors presiding over federally
allotted domains suddenly found that they had to treat
lawyers and litigants with courtesy and respect. If the
judges didn't, the "customers" would go elsewhere. The
judges became more responsive and accessible. They
scheduled hearings for the convenience of the lawyers and
litigants, not merely for their own. They published rules and
guidelines explaining what they wanted from the lawyers,
and they committed to what they would do in response. One
effect was to make the bankruptcy reorganization process
more predictable, generally to the benefit of everyone
involved.
The pressures of competition did not, however, stop at the
boundaries of propriety. The lawyers, corporate executives,
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banks, and investment bankers who chose the courts for
their cases-the "case placers"-had the power to make
winners or losers of the courts. The case placers wanted
more money for themselves and freedom from the
restrictions of bankruptcy law and procedure. In cities
across the United States, they pressed the judges to see how
much each judge was willing to give them.
Slowly but surely, the entire bankruptcy system began
shifting in response to the case placers' wishes. Professional
fees, which had fallen sharply since the 1980s, began to
increase. The courts relaxed conflict of interest standards
and granted lawyers and financial advisers unprecedented
releases and indemnification from liability for their own
wrongdoing. The jobs of executives-including those who led
their companies into financial disaster-became more
secure, and the courts allowed their companies to pay their
executives huge bonuses, supposedly to retain the failed
executives' valuable services. Deals made among the case
placers were sacrosanct, even if they violated the rights of
other parties. Procedures designed to protect small investors
and the public were abandoned."
The case placers had, in essence, taken control of the
United States bankruptcy courts.
CORRUPTION
What made Courting Failure controversial was its
allegation of "corruption" in the United States bankruptcy
courts. Here is the passage in which that word is defined:
To understand how competition is corrupting the U.S.
bankruptcy
courts,
begin by distinguishing
court
competition from mere forum shopping. Courts inevitably
differ in ways that advantage one litigant over another. A
court may interpret a law differently or favor a particular
kind of litigant or case. One court may process cases faster
than others or be geographically more convenient. For
centuries, lawyers have maneuvered their cases into the
courts most advantageous to themselves or their clients.
Forum shopping can yield benefits to shoppers without
courts changing what they are doing-or even realizing that
the shopping is occurring.
By contrast, court competition is an active, deliberate
response by the court to forum shopping. When courts

11. LoPucKI, supranote 1, at 17-18.
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compete, they change what they are doing to make
themselves more attractive to forum shoppers. If more than
one court competes, the process becomes reiterative. Court A
offers to do X for shoppers; court B offers to do X plus Y.
Court C-or court A-can then offer to do even more. The
court that offers forum shoppers the most may be the only
one that gets cases in the end, but all of the judges who
compete are corrupted along the way. Their actions are
''corrupt" in that they are dictated not by an attempt to
apply the law to the
12 facts of the case but by the need to
remain competitive.
"Corruption," as defined here, means ruling on cases in
a manner that the ruling judge knows to be improper.
Courting Failure contains no allegation of corruption
against any particular court or judge. The reason is that I
had no basis for knowing what any particular judge was
thinking at the time of any particular ruling. What
nevertheless made it clear that competition was corrupting
the bankruptcy courts was the pattern of change in the
system as a whole.
Bankruptcy court competition brought quick, fundamental
change to the bankruptcy system. Without policy debate or
legislation, cases got faster, compensation for professionals
and managers increased, and laws and procedures designed
to protect small stakeholders were increasingly ignored. The
movements in these directions have not been relentless.
Sometimes they proceeded by fits and starts. Embarrassed
by public criticism, courts sometimes took steps to rein in
the most egregious of their practices. Some waver so much it
is difficult to say whether they are even in the competition.
But once a new practice that benefits case placers is
introduced, competition assures its acceptance. The only
way for the system to reject the new practice is for every
court to reject it. If even a single court breaks ranks, that
court tends to get the cases, and the practice becomes
dominant.

12. Id. at 137.
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The most damaging changes competition brought were
these.
1. The courts lost control over professional fees.
2. Failed managers tightened their grips on their jobs
and companies.
3. Corporate debtors had more difficulty recovering
money taken by failed managers.
4. Failed managers began paying themselves huge
retention bonuses.
5. The courts began rubber-stamping prepackaged
plans.
6. So-called critical vendors began grabbing the shares
of other unsecured creditors.
7. Managers began selling their companies at
inadequate prices for personal benefit instead of
reorganizing them.
In each of these respects, practices changed quickly
throughout the United States. In each, the change occurred
after 1990, the year in which Delaware initiated the
competition. In none were the changes prompted by
legislation, judicial decision, or policy debate.
In all, the
direction of change favored the case placers. 13
Any particular judge could have reached the conclusion
that the case placers should win on any particular issueand perhaps even that the case placers should win on every
issue in every case. But it is beyond plausibility that so
many judges--on these issues and on every other major
trend in big-case bankruptcy--concluded that the expedient
(competitive) thing to do just happened to be the right thing
to do.
THE COMPETITION GOES GLOBAL

Courting Failure contains two chapters on the critical
changes now taking place with respect to international
competition for big cases. Under the old, "territorial"
system, companies could, and did, file in whatever countries
they chose-regardless of the locations of their assets and
operations. That caused few problems, however, because
the courts' decisions had no effect in other countries beyond
what those other countries chose to grant them. Under the
13. Id. at 139-40.
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new "universalist" system now being implemented,
companies will be required to file in their "home" countries.
The home country court will administer the case worldwide
according to home country law. Countries other than the
home country commit in advance to give effect to the home
countries' decisions.
The problem with the new universalist system is that
large public companies don't actually have "home"
countries. Universalism will give the case placers not only
their choice of courts, but their choice of bankruptcy laws.
Few mechanisms exist to address the problems that result
from international venue abuses. In the European Union,
where a universalist system has been in place since 2002,
forum shopping and court competition quickly became
rampant.
CONCLUSION

Courting Failure correctly predicted that Congress
would award Delaware four additional bankruptcy
judgeships in 2005, and speculated on the consequences.
Two scenarios then seem plausible. In the first, Delaware's
market share again climbs to near 90 percent. This time it
remains there. In three or four years, the shift becomes
irreversible. The skills and experience necessary to process
big bankruptcy cases have grown in Delaware and
disappeared from the rest of the United States. Many of the
top professionals working in the bankruptcy field have
moved to Delaware. Others have been replaced by ambitious
young bankruptcy professionals already in Delaware. The
bankruptcy courtroom construction begun in Delaware in
2003 has been completed and yet more courtroom
construction begun. The bankruptcy court competition ends
with Delaware's victory-just as the corporate charter
competition did around 1920.
In the second plausible scenario, the New York
bankruptcy court fights back. The New York court's location
in lower Manhattan-convenient to the world's leading
bankruptcy
professionals
and
numerous
corporate
headquarters-provides a powerful advantage. Few leading
bankruptcy professionals would prefer to live and work in
Delaware, and so they make an effort to keep as many cases
as possible in New York. (Living in New York while doing
the cases in Delaware is a possibility, but contrary to the
glib assertions sometimes made, it takes substantially
longer for a New York professional to travel to Penn Station,
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take the Metroliner 125 miles to Delaware, and then walk
eight blocks to the Wilmington courthouse than it does to
travel to the New York court in lower Manhattan.) Despite
the New York professionals' work site preference, the New
York court would not win the competition. The New York
professionals would keep the Delaware court alive as a
check on the New York court. With the two courts in
competition, the case placers could play them off against one
another to increase the case placers' power over both. In this
scenario, the New York professionals would reward the New
York court for "good" behavior by doling out cases to the
court in much the same way that a biologist doles out
kernels of corn when training a chicken to do a pirouette.
Eventually, both courts might be dancing to the case placers'
14
tune-pretty much without regard to bankruptcy law.
What will the courts offer the case placers in return for
their favor? Courting Failurepredicts that when the gloves
come off, the competing courts will (1) dispense with the
random draw so each can offer large public companies their
"best"-meaning most competitive-judges, (2) cease trying
to impose any limitations at all on the case placers, and (3)
try instead to craft rulings that will enable the case placers
to externalize costs to third parties.
The initial round of court competition is only now coming
to a close. In that round, the courts focused principally on
procedural matters such as establishing omnibus hearings,
assuring quick action on first-day motions, and paying
professionals monthly. The courts interested in competing
have already made these changes. The case placers no
longer shop for these practices; they can find them in almost
any big city court. Courts interested in improving their
market shares now must offer something more.
The most attractive procedural change an ambitious court
could offer would be to abandon the random draw as the
primary method of assigning big reorganization cases to
judges. The random draw is a powerful tradition in state
and federal courts. It guards against corruption by making it
impossible for case placers to choose particular judges. The
random draw also promotes harmony among the judges of a
panel by protecting each against discrimination in case
assignments.
To the case placers, however, the random draw is
anathema. The case placers want predictability. That is,

14. Id. at 246-47.
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they want to know what the judge will do with their case
before they irrevocably surrender it by filing. The best way
to know what the judge will do is to know who the judge will
be. Recall from chapter 3 that when the Delaware
bankruptcy court went from one judge to two, it began
telling debtors which judge they would get before the
debtors filed. Under a random draw, one toxic judge on a
panel of five or ten is usually enough to drive cases away.
No law requires the bankruptcy courts to assign cases by
random draw. The chief judge of a panel can assign them in
whatever manner the judge chooses. Competitive pressures
have already begun to erode the practice of random
assignment. Both the Houston and Chicago bankruptcy
courts have established separate draws for "complex cases."
Judges of those two courts are excluded from the complex
case draws only if they so request. In Houston, one has. But
if the court competition continues, it is only a matter of time
before courts seize the competitive advantage that would
come from involuntarily eliminating their least attractive
judges from the draws. When that occurs, it will signal that
the bankruptcy court competition has entered its final,
desperate stages. Not only will the case placers be in a
position to play off courts against other courts, they will be
in a position to play off judges of a court against other judges
of the same court.
If Congress allows the bankruptcy court competition to
continue, the substantive changes already visible in the
competing courts' practices will accelerate. To the extent
that the courts have placed any limits on incumbent
managers' pay, authority, or job security, the courts will
remove them. The same will be true of limits on pay,
conflict-of-interest restrictions, or liability releases of
bankruptcy lawyers and investment bankers. The courts will
facilitate sales of companies that enable managers and their
new investors to make a quick profit by externalizing costs
to employees, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation,
local governments, and customers who already own the
firms' products. The bankruptcy courts will actively seek
new ways in which they can protect the case placers from
investigations by criminal prosecutors, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, other regulatory agencies, class
action lawyers, and anyone else who threatens them. 15
Courting Failure offers two alternative proposals for
reform. The first is to require companies to file in their local

15. Id. at 249-50.
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bankruptcy courts. The second is to establish regional
courts that would specialize in big-case reorganizations.
First, Congress could adopt venue rules similar to those
proposed by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission in
1997. The new rules should delete the debtor's place of
incorporation from the list of proper venues and provide for
the mandatory transfer of misfiled cases to the proper
venue. With few exceptions, Delaware would no longer be a
proper venue.
These new rules should also eliminate the venue hookthe ability of a parent company to file in the court where the
bankruptcy of a subsidiary is pending. Members of a
corporate group should be allowed to reorganize together
only at the location of the parent company or the group.
These changes would effectively require a company to file
its bankruptcy at the location of the company's headquarters
or principal assets. Companies with headquarters and
principal assets in different districts would still be able to
choose between the two districts. Companies would also
remain free to move their headquarters or principal assets
to the district in which they chose to file. That means some
shopping could continue, enabling companies to escape
particularly bad courts. But such shoppers would not exist
in sufficient numbers to corrupt courts that hoped to attract
them.
One problem with requiring companies to file in their local
bankruptcy courts is that few of those local courts would
have much expertise in the reorganization of large public
companies. To put the same point another way, the big-case
expertise of the American bankruptcy courts would be
spread among so many judges that few or none could
develop substantial expertise.
As an alternative to the rules just discussed, Congress
might establish specialized bankruptcy courts at three or
four locations in the United States to handle only the largest
cases. Each of the specialized courts would serve a specified
territory. Companies over a specified size would all file their
bankruptcy cases with a single judge. Working from
information required to be filed with the petition, that judge
would assign each case to the most appropriate of the four
considerations. The
courts based on geographical
day the company
same
on
the
made
be
assignment would
filed the case. 16

16. Id. at 252-53.
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UPDATE

Courting Failure was published at the end of January,
2005. The following month, the Senate Judiciary
Committee began considering the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(BAPCPA). 17 Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex), who had, as
attorney general of the State of Texas, represented the
creditors who petitioned unsuccessfully for a change of
venue in the Enron case, took up the cause of bankruptcy
venue reform. Senator Cornyn introduced the Fairness in
Bankruptcy Litigation Act of 2005.18 The bill would require
that companies file in their local bankruptcy courts, echoing
both the recommendations of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission and the first of my alternative
proposals described above. During committee debate,
Senator Cornyn had a copy of CourtingFailure on his desk
and, at one juncture during his speech, held it aloft to make
a point. Senator Cornyn declared his intention to move to
amend the BAPCPA to add the provisions of his venue bill.
Fearful that the venue amendment would break up the bipartisan coalition supporting the BAPCPA, the Republican
leadership prevailed upon Cornyn not to make his motion.
He did not make the motion, but his venue bill remains
pending in the Senate.
Congress enacted the BAPCPA in May 2005 and it went
into effect on October 17 of that year. The Third Circuit
then began the process of selecting Delaware's four new
bankruptcy judges. Of the four candidates chosen, three
were Delaware bankruptcy lawyers and the fourth was a
Philadelphia bankruptcy judge who recently had been
serving as a visiting bankruptcy judge in Delaware. As the
new judges took office in the spring of 2006, big-case
bankruptcy filings were at only one-fourth the level they
were when congressional leaders decided Delaware needed
four new judges and the biggest bankrupt companies were
uniformly choosing New York over Delaware. Thus, the new
Delaware judges' work is cut out for them. If they want the
big cases, they are going to have to fight for them.

17. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
18. S. 314, 109th Cong. (2005).

